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5PREFACE
Ancient Greek Psychology and the Modern Mind-Body Debate was 
originally published by Aarhus University Press in 1987. It has 
long been sold out and there seems still to be a demand for it. So 
I have decided to make it available again, both in print and elec-
tronically. It is basically the same book, but it has undergone ‘mi-
nor’ corrections and been provided with an extensively updated 
bibliography and an updating ch. VII: ‘Recent Work on Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s Psychology’. Also, an entirely new layout has hopefully 
made it more reader friendly. I should perhaps indicate that the 
title of this book may mislead potential readers to think that all 
ancient thinkers will be dealt with. The reason and excuse for 
keeping the title is that the towering figures of Plato and Aristot-
le are what the moderns are influenced by and up against in all 
areas, not least in psychology.
I would like to use this occasion to express my gratitude to Prof. 
David Hamlyn who originally suggested that I wrote this book. It 
will appear that it owes a great debt to his work on especially Aris-
totle’s psychology. Another, different, inspiration derives from my 
old supervisor in Oxford, Mr. I. M. Crombie of Wadham College. I 
could not have done without his thoughtful comments on my work 
on Platonic psychology.
Finally, I should mention another type of necessary condition 
for the present work: Marianne Gulstad, Publizon.dk, who with 
great care prepared the layout of this new edition, and, as always, 
my wife, Gudrun Ostenfeld, who with caring support has made it 
all possible.
E.O.
Aarhus 2018
7INTRODUCTION
We shall try to answer two questions. First, is Plato’s and Aris-
totle’s philosophy of psyche and nous at all relevant for the mod-
ern debate on the notion of mind? Are Plato and Aristotle dealing 
with the same (or a similar) problem as we are? Or as Descartes 
was? Second, if the answer to the above is a positive one, do Plato 
and Aristotle then have something useful to say on the mind-body 
issue? We can dub the first question the relevance question and 
the second one the usefulness question. As for relevance, it has 
been argued1 that the Greeks simply failed to see the mind-body 
problem. In that case, they can hardly have had the same notion 
of soul (mind) as Descartes. 
But in order to evaluate this claim it will be necessary to look 
first (ch. I) at some criteria of the mental, Cartesian and, more 
generally, post-Cartesian, i.e. modern. With these in mind we look 
next (ch. II) at some possibly relevant contrasts drawn in Plato. 
This should then enable us to answer the question (assuming that 
1 Cf. Wallace Matson and Wilkes ch. 7. Their glorification of Greek in-
nocence on the mind-body issue should be tempered by consideration of: (1) Or-
phic-Pythagorean texts, e.g., Pindar’s Second Olympian Ode and Empedocles’ 
Katharmoi. We have here a concept of soul that is quite distinct from the body 
and a connected moral gulf. (2) The sober-minded dualism of Anaxagoras: 
nous is ‘mixed with nothing, but is all alone by itself ’, and it knows everything 
about everything and has greatest power (frg. 12). Even if it is not yet conceived 
of as incorporeal, it transcends the corporeal in its epistemic and teleological 
motive power. This kind of dualism is refined further in Plato and Aristotle who 
both see that mind must be a non-bodily or simple substance. Hence, Matson’s 
and Wilkes’ monistic conception of not only Aristotle but the Greeks in general 
is misguided. It might even prove difficult to defend their common assumption 
that the Greek notion of nature can be understood in physicalistic terms (cf. e.g. 
Jaeger 195 n. 25, Kahn (1960) 437, Collingwood 111).
Similarly, it has recently been claimed that the Greeks lacked the mental/
physical distinction. This cannot be accepted as true, unless specified as the 
private/public distinction, and even that is not foreign to, e.g., Plato (see ch. II 
below).
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Plato remained a dualist of some kind): What kind(s) of dualism 
does Plato espouse or is he committed to (ch. III)? This again pre-
pares the way for a comparison with Descartes (ch. IV) and finally 
with today’s discussion (ch. V). The usefulness question will be 
dealt with in ch. V. After concluding remarks in ch. VI follows an 
overview of Platonic-Aristotelian psychology with comments on 
recent scholarship on selected debated topics.
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CRITERIA OF THE MENTAL
Ever since Descartes concluded that he was a substance whose 
whole essence or nature is to think (penser2), that he was simply 
a thinking non-extended indivisible being,3 the understanding of 
the difference between man and nature has been in terms of con-
sciousness, or if consciousness is not accepted it is used as a point 
of departure that needs to be explained away. So Descartes set the 
frame of reference for the modern discussion of the nature of man. 
The mental/physical dichotomy of the modern debate may, in a 
way we shall explain, be said to stem from Descartes.
Descartes focused on mens, rather than anima. The latter 
term was at the time equivocal between life and thinking and 
Descartes, regarding the two functions as wholly distinct, concen-
trated on thinking and narrowed the field of psychology down to 
the study of the mental. Going with this is a conception of the 
physical as identical with extension of which shape and mechani-
cal motion are aspects.4 According to Descartes, thinking (a) can-
not be explained in physical terms and (b) cannot be conceived 
not to exist. This sets it out from extension, so much so that the 
two basic properties are considered incompatible (nothing can be 
both). This finally led Descartes to think that nature contains two 
basic independent kinds of thing, the mental and the physical. It 
is notable that the soul/mind is something subjective or private for 
Descartes (we have direct indubitable access to it). Hence, after 
2 Discourse IV. In Princ. Part I, IX cogitatio is explained as: everything 
that takes place within ourselves so that we are conscious of it (nobis consciis) 
in so far as it is an object of awareness (conscientia). In this way (the mark of) 
the mental becomes consciousness.
3 Med. IV.
4 Princ. Part I, LIII.
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VII  
RECENT WORK ON PLATO’S  
AND ARISTOTLE’S PSYCHOLOGY
The strategy of this chapter is to offer an overview of Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s psychology as I have come to see it and alongside com-
ment on recent work on relevant topics. This procedure has the 
unavoidable consequence that I sometimes have to return to cer-
tain hotly debated areas already dealt with in earlier chapters.
Plato
Compared to the industry of papers and books on Aristotle, the 
output on Plato is relatively limited. Especially on his general 
view of soul and soul and body.1
Sabina Lovibond (1991) comments concisely that ‘Plato invent-
ed the idea of ‘mind’ with which modern European languages op-
1 The following scholarly work on Plato is a preliminary selection. Of 
general studies there is a 2nd edition of T.M. Robinson’s Plato’s Psychology 
(1995) (with a new introduction but unrevised main text and unupdated bibli-
ography). L.P. Gerson, ‘Platonic Dualism’ (1986), S. Lovibond, ‘Plato’s Theory 
of Mind’ (1991), A. Silverman, ‘Plato: Psychology’ (2003), F. Miller, ‘The Pla-
tonic Soul’ (2006), V. Karasmanis, ‘Soul and Body in Plato’ (2006), H. Lorenz, 
‘Plato’s theories of soul’ (2009) (on the Phaedo and Republic only), G. Carone, 
‘Mind and Body in late Plato’ (2005). 
Specific topics discussed are: 
Immortality: T.M. Robinson (1971), D. Bostock (1986 and 1999), D. Gallop 
(1982), D. Frede (1978), E.A. Brown (1997), R. Bett (1986), D. Sedley (2009), 
and commentaries on the Phaedo.
Recollection: D. Scott (1999), C. Kahn (2006).
Tripartition: R. Robinson (1971), B. Williams (1973), Stalley (1975), Bobon-
ich (1994), N.D. Smith (1999), C. Shields (2001 and 2010), G. Anagnostopoulos, 
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erate’ and ‘is responsible [ ] for the entrenched tendency to posit 
‘mind’ (or in certain contexts, ‘soul’) as a substantial component of 
our nature.’ It is important to keep in mind all the time that we 
are talking here about the broad concept of psyche (????), basically 
a life principle. For Plato this soul is not only what animates and 
moves the body, but also what does the thinking. Hence the soul 
is characterized and differentiated from the body by its cognitive 
and kinetic capabilities: it must be abstract to some extent in order 
to contemplate abstract ideas, and it must have a dynamic-telic 
nature in order to account for motion and action. 
The Socratic soul
It is reasonable and practical to regard the Corpus as being divid-
ed into three traditional parts: early, middle and late dialogues. 
The early so-called Socratic dialogues are marked by an intellec-
tualism, the view that everybody seeks the good and that knowl-
edge is sufficient for the attainment of the good.2 Failure is due to 
ignorance, not to weak will or being mastered by passions.3 The 
picture of soul as mind is dominant. Socrates is skeptical about its 
survival (Ap. 40b-41c, 29a), although one should care for wisdom 
(2006), M. Burnyeat (2006), F. Miller (2006), A. Price (2008), H. Lorenz (2008 
and 2009), Barney/Brennan/Brittain (eds.), Plato and the Divided Self (2012). 
Moral psychology: T. Penner (1971, 2006), A. Price (1995), R. Kamtakar 
(2017).
Human motivation: J. Cooper (1984). 
Akrasia: C. Bobonich (1994), G.R. Carone (2001).
Self-motion: R. Demos (1978), F. Miller (2006).
Perception: J. Cooper (1970), M. Burnyeat (1976), A. Silverman (1990), D. 
Modrak (2006), and commentaries on the Theaetetus.
It is also worth mentioning International Plato Studies (the Proceedings of 
the International Plato Society on several dialogues). Here one can also find 
valuable studies on Platonic psychology. The extensive bibliography of Plato 
and the Divided Self, eds. R. Barney, Tad Brennan and C. Brittain, Cambridge 
2012, also contains a variety of studies relevant to Platonic psychology.
2 Heda Segvic (2000) gives a useful analysis of the concept of intellectu-
alism as traditionally used (the non-rational is not given its due because of an 
overly rational mindset), and offers her own interpretation (the non-rational is 
an integral part of the knowledge in which Socrates locates virtue, and every 
act actually involves an act of reason).
3 Lorenz (2008) points out that the relevant sense of ??????? is action 
against actual knowledge of the best course, not being mastered by passion.
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and truth (29e) and be as good and wise as possible (36c). As he is 
obsessed with not wronging anybody and thereby himself (37ab, 
cf. 29b), he obviously regards morality to be one part of his self. 
A good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death (41cd, cf. 
30cd). The other part is the love of and search for wisdom (philos-
ophy).
The separable simple substance soul and the embodied tripartite 
soul
In the middle dialogues, for instance the Phaedo, the picture is dif-
ferent. We have two parts: soul and body (79b). Death means the 
separation of soul and body (64c), and the soul caring for knowl-
edge should strive for separation from the disturbances of the 
body. The soul is clearly still conceived of as mind. Immortality is 
‘proved’ in four much-debated arguments: In the first, cyclical ar-
gument, the soul is seen as a bearer of life and death and thus as 
a substance, a life-principle. In the second, from recollection, the 
soul is shown to have existed before incarnation as a contemplator 
of Forms, a cognitive principle. The third argument, from affinity 
to the Forms, argues that Forms are constant, simple and invis-
ible, and that the soul to some extent shares not only invisibility 
with the Forms but also constancy, incompositeness and hence in-
destructibility. Kinship with Forms is also revealed when the soul 
engages in contemplation (abstract thought) and turns away from 
sense-perception (79de). And its kinship with the divine is seen in 
that it naturally rules while the body is ruled (80a). We conclude 
that the Form-like and divine soul is here viewed as a substance. 
In an interlude, the harmony theory of soul is disproved by a se-
ries of reductios: 1) a harmony cannot direct or move its compo-
nents as we have just seen the soul does, 2) a harmony can (but the 
soul cannot) have degrees, 3) goodness being a harmony cannot be 
accommodated within another harmony. Hence if a soul-harmony 
cannot have degrees (as the soul cannot), then such a soul cannot 
share in wickedness (disharmony) and all souls would be equally 
good. This implies that the soul is not a property (harmony), but a 
substance capable of causal efficacy exerted on the body. A psycho-
logical conflict is therefore entertained as possible, here between 
CH A PTER V II
112
the soul and the ensouled body (Odysseus controlling his anger). 
The final proof operates with a soul substance that is essentially 
alive and therefore, controversially, cannot die.4 The soul is not a 
Form (that would not require a proof of immortality). But because 
of its special relation to Forms, it is either a special particular es-
sentially alive or alternatively a Form-copy.5 Even if they are ac-
cepted, these arguments deal only with an impersonal soul: there 
is not much individuality about a pure intellect and a life-princi-
ple. Moreover, the arguments are best viewed as dialectical ex-
ercises.6 The weaknesses of these arguments have naturally oc-
cupied scholars, but our interest here is the presuppositions and 
implications for the view of soul. It can be concluded that the soul 
is both a cognitive and a life-soul. This has been seen as a prob-
lem.7 How could a life-soul be combined with a reasoning power? 
Plato would probably see thinking as a privileged life.8 Similarly, 
the constant soul of the affinity argument has been seen as prob-
lematic in connection with a life-soul.9 In fact, the constant soul is 
perfectly compatible with the life-soul of both the cyclical and the 
final argument,10 and of course with the contemplative power.
It may be said that the Symposium provides the ingredients 
of an answer in dealing with the development of Eros, the great 
Daemon, the drive of love that may be transformed from bodily at-
traction to increasingly abstract objects ending in contemplation 
4 In a thoughtful article, D. Sedley (2009) defends this as the best ar-
gument for immortality in Plato (152). Strato’s objection (Damscius, in Phd. I 
442) that there is no such thing as a dead soul does not show that a soul always 
exists, is faced with the laws of logic: the soul is essentially alive (151).
5 Cf., e.g., J. Schiller (1967), A. Silverman (2003) 134-136.
6 Plato himself advocates further examination of the premises (107b). 
But Socrates invests hope in traditional wisdom (63c, e).
7 Gallop (1975) 90-91, D. Bostock (1999) 424, A. Silverman (2003) 136, 
F.D. Miller (2006) 286.
8 It may of course be said that contemplation is a different life, difficult 
to combine with a practical life (cf. Aristotle’s problem). The soul is pure intel-
lect by nature, but happens to be embodied with the demands it meets there. 
Conversely, there is no implication that all life must be intellectual.
9 T.M. Robinson (1995) 114-5.
10 The former is a permanent substance in the cycles, and the latter is a 
form-like substance.
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of beauty itself. It is significant that Eros is a philosopher (Sym. 
203d7). This suggests that we have here the mind (intellect) of the 
Phaedo in new clothes. One may view mind as an intermediate 
being (a daemon), a source of goal-directed energy (life) that may 
be directed from concrete and personal concerns to abstract and 
impersonal targets. Eros, as a daemon, is neither immortal nor 
mortal (Sym. 203d8 f.), but stands for a longing for the good forev-
er, i.e. immortality (ibid. 205e-207a). This longing is implemented 
in procreation in the beautiful (206e5). While mortals seek im-
mortality in the only way possible, by leaving behind something 
new replacing the old (207d, 208b2-4), procreation (????????) is 
something immortal in the mortal being (206c, cf. e f.). It is com-
monplace to regret the omission of immortality in this dialogue, 
but there may be more than a hint that there is more to the mortal 
soul and body, namely the procreative drive, which may end in the 
vision of Beauty itself.11 This would bring the Symposium into line. 
But it is also controversial.12
The tripartite soul is the new great theme of the Republic, and 
again in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus. This has been claimed 
to be ‘Plato’s central contribution to psychology.’13 It is certainly 
and primarily a central theme in Plato’s view of the soul. There is 
a growing realization on his part of the importance of the non-ra-
tional. Starting out with the ‘Socratic intellectualism,’ where the 
soul is reason (mind), he moves on to the Phaedo, where ‘bodily’ 
non-rational desires and emotions are controlled by the mind. Fi-
nally, in the Republic the non-rational is incorporated in the soul 
as parts of the soul. There is the well-known fact of mental con-
11 D. Sedley (2009) partly follows this line of thought, which he calls 
‘earned immortality’ (156ff). But it cannot be denied that there is a tension be-
tween the neither immortal nor mortal daemon and the immortal element. Cf. 
the following note.
12 It is perhaps relevant to note that the immortal (divine) part of the 
soul in the Timaeus (90a, c) is a daemon. The reservation (‘achieve immortal-
ity as fully as is permitted to human nature’ (90c2-3) concerns ‘human na-
ture’, not the divine part. This fits in with the picture of human souls in the 
Phaedrus (248a-d) striving to follow the gods to gain a vision of the Forms.
13 Lorenz (2008) 243. Originally, Grube, in his fine book (1935) 133, 
stressed that the concept of ?????? is ‘one of the most startlingly modern things 
in Platonic philosophy.’
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flict, which is now analyzed by means of the ‘principle of opposites’: 
‘one and the same thing cannot act or be affected in opposite ways 
at the same time in the same part of it and in relation to the same 
object’ (R. 436b).14 This ‘hypothesis’ leads to analyzing the soul in 
three parts: reason, spirit (thumos) and appetite. Are they facul-
ties or capacities? Is reason just a Humean capacity to figure out 
the means of desire, without its own goal? Appetite is seen here as 
blind good-independent thirst (439a, d). Are there not three drives 
or motives involved, each with its own goal? We are told that the 
elements and traits of the state must exist in the individual too: 
?????????, ?????????, ???????????? (435e f). These are all drives (cf. 
????????? 436b2, cf. 604b). The validity of the argument has been 
questioned: can a person have both a pro-attitude and a con-at-
titude to the same thing?15 There has also been a debate among 
scholars about the nature of appetite. To what extent is it ‘ration-
al’? Can it form its own goals, or is it even capable of means-end 
reasoning?16 The answer to the latter is probably ‘no’. Understand-
ing the nature of reason has also been controversial17: It is true 
that reason (the understanding element) is explicitly described as 
almost solely bent on knowing the truth (581b). The reasonable 
man can go to sleep with a reason that can freely reach out to-
14 When repeated at 436e9-437a2, it is added that opposite predicates 
are also excluded: one and the same thing cannot ‘be’ characterized in opposite 
ways.
15 Burnyeat (2006). Miller (1995), Stalley (1975) and Lorenz (2008) 257 
interpret in directional terms and defend Plato. Moreover, as a matter of fact 
you cannot as a whole move forward and backwards toward the same object. 
But Plato may envisage more than empirical necessity, cf. previous note. Pla-
to may thus be thinking of the kind of opposite that Aristotle called ??????? 
(Cat.11b38). They cannot both be true, but may both be false, e.g., white and 
black.
16 Lorenz (2008) 260-263 argues for the first alternative. Annas (1981) 
129 f. and Bobonich (2002) 244 take the second alternative. However, when the 
elements of the soul turn up again in book ix (580d-581b), it is with a view to 
evaluating the lives of men dominated by different motives or drives. So calling 
appetite ‘profit seeking’ must be understood in context and cannot be taken to 
indicate the cognitive resources of that element per se. Rep. 439a on desire for 
just drink and Timaeus 77b5-6 on the irrationality of appetite seem to decide 
the case.
17 Ferrari (2007) 191 ff.. 
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ward awareness of what it does not know (572a). But reason also 
has to rule the other two parts of the soul (R. 439-441). However, 
this does not imply that reason has two inherent desires, to rule 
and to understand.18 Reason has one interest (like the guardians), 
namely spending its time searching for truth. Ruling is (as for the 
guardians) a necessity, a consequence of incarnation. It is not that 
reason just suppresses (606a, c) the other elements to avoid their 
interference. It needs their assistance in its bodily situation and 
therefore regulates and trains (604d) them in the best way, being 
able to reflect about good and evil (R. 441b, e, cf. 606d).19
The innovation of the Republic in psychology thus acknowledg-
es human motives other than pursuance of the good. Honor, pleas-
ure and the avoidance of their opposites must be reckoned with as 
well. This implies that desire and action may aim at goals which 
are acknowledged to be bad.20
In the Republic it is the embodied soul that is tripartite. It is 
certainly the tripartition of this soul that is analyzed. It is unclear 
whether the disembodied, immortal soul of bk. X is tripartite: ‘it 
is not easy for something composite of many parts and not beau-
tifully composed to be immortal’ (611b5-7). However, its love of 
wisdom (philosophia) points to kinship with the divine. Extrapo-
lating from this, one may get an idea of ‘its true nature, whether 
composite or uniform and how’ (612a3-5). The hint that it may 
be ‘beautifully composed’ is perhaps confirmed in the Phaedrus, 
where we again find some hesitancy to state the truth about the 
disembodied soul, which is only likened to a charioteer with a pair 
of horses. The gods, too, have composite but more harmonious 
souls with two good horses (reason) – in contrast to humans, who 
have to cope with a good and a bad horse. The implication seems 
to be that before the ‘fall’ of the ‘human’ soul it was divine (reason) 
too and beautifully composed. If this is correct, it conforms to the 
view of the Timaeus, where only divine reason, a god-given dai-
18  Ferrari (2007), Klosko (1988). Cross/Woozley (1964) and Cooper 
(1984) for the opposite view.
19  The good/bad in the long run, that is.
20  Lorenz (2008) 264. This break with earlier (Socratic) psychology has 
been contested by Ferrari (1990), Carone (2001) and Weiss (2006). 
CH A PTER V II
116
mon, is immortal, the other parts being accretions consequent on 
incarnation as in Rep. x. 
The embodied tripartite soul has been an inspiration for 
Freud’s tripartite soul and modern psychology, not least because 
of its definition of mental health as psychic harmony.21 In bk. x the 
restraint of reason is associated with internalized social restraint 
(e.g. 604ab, 606bc), and we are reminded that reason, too, needs 
training (606a, cf. 441e f.). For Freud a part of the Id develops 
into the Ego, which later forms the Superego. Plato too, in a way, 
implies a genetic account in so far as children are full of spirit and 
only later (if ever) become reasonable (441ab).22 Reason may then 
hopefully be trained to observe social norms (604d, 606b). The 
basis for this seems to be fear and shame (606bc). These feelings 
are not irrational, but have cognitive content. Blind desire,23 on 
the other hand, is shameless (571cd, 572b, cf. Phdr. 250e). It is 
grounded in biology and therefore developmentally basic, like the 
Id. Spirit has some sense of shame, in that it is not roused when a 
man feels he is wrong (440c). The Ego has some similarity to Pla-
tonic reason, but the latter seems less impotent and shares some 
traits of the Superego. So there is no 1-1 correspondence. More-
over, the whole project of dividing the soul is in general a matter of 
debate, and Plato’s division in particular has been problematized. 
There is an argument for the immortality of the soul in R. x, 
608c-611a: (1) things have a natural good and evil, (2) they can 
only be destroyed by that evil (the good and neutral are not de-
structive), (3) the natural evil of the body is disease, and it de-
stroys it eventually. (4) However, the natural evil of the soul, in-
justice and vice, cannot destroy it and sever it from the body. (5) 
It is impossible that something can be destroyed by the evil of 
something else, unless that evil produces natural evil (e.g. if the 
body contracts a disease owing to bad food). (6) Similarly, the soul 
21  Ferrari (2007), Lear (1992), Santas (1988) and Price (1990). Kenny 
(1973) 12-14 has noted similarities between reason and the ego and some sim-
ilarities and differences between spirit and the superego.
22  Contra Ferrari (2007) 177. However, this is empirical psychology, 
nothing to do with the metaphysical soul. 
23  R. 439d.
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cannot be destroyed by a diseased body, unless that evil produces 
injustice and vice. (7) Hence, not being destroyed by either its own 
evil or that of something else, the soul is immortal. 
This proof has been regarded as below Plato’s standard.24 
However, the first two premises are part of Plato’s metaphys-
ics of functions and optimal or bad states (R. 352d-354a), and 
must be judged in that context.25 Premise (4) seems weak and 
questionable, even on Plato’s own terms (Crit. 47d). Having 
pointed out the difference between body and soul and men-
tioned that the destruction of the soul means severance from 
the body (with implied dualism), Plato turns to a long defense 
of (2). The obvious objection that what eventually kills the soul 
is a bodily evil is met by the claim that it has to be done via 
the evil of the soul. This is supported by the general theory of 
destruction, which again is part of a metaphysics of functions. 
Everything has a function. The body and its parts and the soul 
have a function. The specific assumption here is that the soul 
is essentially a moral principle (substance)26 which is unaffect-
ed by whatever happens to the body. They are totally different 
substances.27 This is in line with Ap. 41cd, cf. 30cd (a good man 
cannot be harmed)28, but not with Crit. 47d (that part of us is 
24  Brown (1997) has offered a defense against, e.g., Annas 1981.
25  Brown notes this.
26  Cf. Rep. 353d: the soul’s function is to care, govern, deliberate and in-
deed live.
27  Annas is particularly critical of this argument, which is ‘question-beg-
ging’ (1981, 345 f.). But this is a straw man. Plato is not assuming without ar-
guing that the soul is a different kind of thing from the body. This is argued 
in, e.g., the Phaedo, the Crito and the Republic generally. And the fact that 
it is unaffected by the body is part of his general theory of functions argued 
elsewhere. Hence it cannot be claimed that it is assumed at the outset that the 
soul is indestructible. Annas also wonders why a consequence of the proof is a 
‘plurality of immortal souls’. But what Plato is telling us is that the number of 
souls is constant (611a): obviously no decrease and also no increase, if at the 
expense of mortality (assuming a finite world). But again, one should not read 
a Platonic text in isolation. The background here (for what it is worth) is the 
cyclical argument of the Phaedo.
28  Care of the soul is also important, as wealth does not make the soul 
excellent, but excellence makes wealth and everything good for men (Ap. 30b). 
Cf. Charmides for the holistic thought that the soul is the source of bodily 
health and disease (156b-157a). Just as eyes are part of the head, and the head 
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improved by just actions and destroyed29 by unjust actions). 
 Two consequences are then drawn from the immortality of the 
soul: (1) the number of souls is constant (implied in the cyclical 
argument at Phd. 72b-d), and (2) the soul in its true nature must 
have some kind of unity. The empirical composite soul with con-
flicting parts cannot ‘easily’ be immortal (611b). If we extrapolate 
from the soul’s love of wisdom and its associating with the Forms, 
we may gather (by reason) its ‘true nature, composite or single or 
whatever’ (612a). Plato is trading on his proof from affinity in the 
Phaedo here (78b-80b, esp. 79de).
The self-mover soul
The self-moving soul is encountered in the Phaedrus, the Timaeus 
(37b5, 36e3-4, 89a1-3) and the Laws (893c-896c). There are impli-
cations of it in the Sophist (248a ff.) and the Politicus (269c-270a). 
This is a permanent shift in focus, if not a fundamental change 
in the doctrine of soul.30 The Phaedrus introduces the new view 
of the soul as a self-mover, both in an argument for immortality 
(245c-246a) and in the memorable metaphor of a charioteer with 
a good and bad horse (246ab, 246b-248e). It may be said that the 
conception of soul as an animating principle in the Phaedo in some 
sense anticipated what has now developed into something which is 
both more concrete and more general: a principle of motion, and in 
Timaeus and Laws a world-soul.
The proof goes like this in the main: the ever-moving is im-
mortal, the self-moving is ever-moving, hence the self-moving is 
immortal. But the soul is self-moving, hence the soul is immortal.
A closer look shows the details and sub-arguments:
is part of the body, so the body seems to be part of the soul, which is the whole. 
There is thus an asymmetry in the soul-body interaction, the health of the soul 
being a necessary condition of the health of the body, but presumably not vice 
versa.
29  Contra the Republic proof, where injustice does not kill.
30  I follow Brandwood’s chronology (1990 and 1992), which groups Ti-
maeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus and Laws together as the last 
group, after a group of four: Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus. 
See also Young (1994) for an overview. Hence, the Phaedrus belongs to another, 
earlier group than the six late dialogues.
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(A)  The ever-moving is immortal.
Only the self-moving can be ever-moving, and as a first prin-
ciple it moves all other things.
(B)  A first principle cannot come into being (if it did, it would not 
be a first principle).
It must also be imperishable (if not, nothing could come to be, 
and nothing can bring it back as that would require a first 
principle).
(C) But the self-mover is a first principle of motion (which can 
neither be destroyed nor come into being. Otherwise the uni-
verse would end in immobility and not be brought back).
So the self-moving is immortal.
But the soul’s essence is self-motion, for bodies with an exter-
nal source of motion are soulless, whereas those with internal 
sources of motion are besouled (animate).
Therefore: all soul is immortal (unborn and does not die).31
The strategy is to identify the ever-moving with the self-mov-
er, which is then interpreted as a principle (arche) with the spe-
cial status of being ungenerated and imperishable. Finally, the 
self-mover is identified with the soul. One might feel that part (B) 
about the principle is unnecessary: once the ever-moving had been 
identified with the self-mover, Plato could move straight on to its 
identification with the soul. However, arguing via the principle en-
ables him to strengthen the argument with two reductio ad absur-
dum arguments against generation and annihilation respectively. 
The next question is: What ontological status does this self-mov-
ing principle have? The identification with the soul is based on the 
observation that ensouled bodies are self-moving. This is a non se-
quitur. It is unclear whether it is the organism or a ‘part’ of it that 
is the self-mover. However, the first alternative is excluded as the 
31  It is not stated explicitly (but perhaps implicitly) that the reference is 
to a world-soul (one meaning of ???? ????, ‘all soul’ 245c5). It should in fair-
ness be noted that ??? [ ] ???? near the end of the argument is used distribu-
tively. Similarly, at 246b6-7 ???? ???? is used distributively, and T.M. Robin-
son (1995) 115 may be right that it should be translated ‘soul in all its forms.’ 
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an attribute it cannot exist apart from a body. Hence it must be 
reincarnated to survive. But it seems still to have the status of a 
substance. Hence a sort of dualism is preserved, but a dualism 
of mental and corporeal attributes, of teleology and mechanism.51 
Similar to the Aristotelian dualism. To some extent, the picture 
which was drawn in the first edition (1987) of this volume has 
been confirmed by subsequent scholarship.52
Aristotle
Aristotle was the first to devote a special work, the small treatise 
De Anima, to the subject of the soul (???? as the source of life, an 
explanation of what characterizes living beings). Part of his phi-
losophy of soul is also a much-debated discussion of intellect (????). 
Aristotle’s philosophy of soul and mind has enjoyed much more 
attention recently than Plato’s thoughts on soul, simply because 
it looks much more relevant to the modern debate. More precise-
ly, his hylomorphism has appeared as an alternative to Cartesian 
dualism on the one hand, and to materialism on the other. This 
alternative has often been interpreted as attributivism: the soul 
is an attribute of the body. Much work has then gone into under-
standing the status of this attribute.53 
It is important to realize that Aristotle is reacting to his prede-
cessors and especially his teacher, Plato. This clear from De Ani-
51 FMM 252 and pp. 78-83 above. Plato and Aristotle share the (to us) 
hybrid concept of a substantival attribute. The corporeal attributes are here 
less (or not) substantival.
52 I am thinking of, e.g., H. Granger (1996) chs. 6-7 and C. Shields (2009).
53 See the following selection (cf. also Caston (2006) 318) exhibiting a va-
riety of general treatments of the soul-body relation:
– Dualism: D. Hamlyn, ‘Aristotle’s Cartesianism’ (1978), H.M. Robinson, 
‘Mind and Body in Aristotle’ (1978) and ‘Aristotelian Dualism’ (1983).
– Materialism (central-state materialism): e.g., R. Sorabji, ‘Body and Soul 
in Aristotle’ (1974), L.A. Kosman, ‘Perceiving that We Perceive: On the Soul 
III, 2’ (1975), E. Hartman, Substance, Body and Soul (1977). 
– Nonreductionist materialism: J. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (1981), 
D. Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (1984), M. Frede, ‘On Aristotle’s 
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ma I. Here we are told what the soul is not. The soul has typically 
and historically been characterized by the production of move-
ment and cognition. Interestingly, the focus is on the Timaeus, 
both in I 2 (on the earlier opinions), where the issue is cognition: 
the soul is composed of the elements, and in I 3 (critical evaluation 
of the earlier views), where the self-mover soul is refuted in great 
detail. The main objection to the Timaeus soul is that it is extend-
ed (???????), and that its motion is local, rotation in the case of rea-
son. In other words, and paradoxically, Plato is too materialistic 
for Aristotle’s taste. An important criticism of Plato here is that 
the relationship with the body is claimed to be contingent, like the 
Pythagorean transmigration story (407b12-26). Aristotle must be 
thinking of the individual soul here, as Plato did believe in trans-
Conception of Soul’ (1992). 
– Functionalism: C. Shields, ‘The First Functionalist’ (1990), T. Irwin, ‘Ar-
istotle’s Philosophy of Mind’ (1991), M. Nussbaum and H. Putnam, ‘Changing 
Aristotle’s Mind’ (1992), K.V. Wilkes, ‘Psuche versus the Mind’ (1992).
– Supervenience (epiphenomenalism): C. Shields, ‘Soul and Body in Aristot-
le’ (1988), ‘The Soul as Subject in Aristotle’s De Anima’ (1988), R. Heinaman, 
‘Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem (1990), M. Wedin, ‘Content and Cause in 
the Aristotelian Mind’ (1992) and ‘Aristotle on How to Define a Psychological 
State’ (1996), S. Everson, ‘Psychology’ (1995), V. Caston, ‘Aristotle and Super-
venience’ (1992), ‘Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern’ (1997) and ‘Aris-
totle’s Psychology’ (2009).
– Emergence: J. Ackrill, ‘Aristotle’s Definitions of Psyche’ (1972-3), Caston, 
‘Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern’ (1997). 
– Immaterialist epigenesis: F. Miller, ‘Aristotle’s ‘Philosophy of Soul’ (1999).
– Sui generis: R. Sorabji, ‘Body and Soul in Aristotle’ (1974), E.N. Osten-
feld, Ancient Greek Psychology (19871), H. Granger, Aristotle’s Idea of the Soul 
(1996).
G. Matthews, ‘Aristotle: Psychology’ (2003) and C. Shields, ‘Aristotle’s Psy-
chology’ (2016) are neutrally informative. 
There are of course also specific studies on aspects of Aristotle’s psychology 
(with apologies for not labelling the views as intended by the authors):
 – Perception: W.D. Ross (19495), Barnes (1971/2) (weak physicalism), W. 
Matson (1966), T.J. Slakey (1961), R. Sorabji (1974) (strong physicalism), Solm-
sen (1961), Burnyeat (1992, 2002) (nonphysical), S. Everson (1997), V. Caston 
(2005) (supervenience), D. Modrak (1987), A. Marmodoro (2018). 
– Desire and action: M. Nussbaum (1978) (functionalism), D. Charles (2009) 
(non-reductionalist  materialism). 
M. Nussbaum & A. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (1992) is 
a rich source of explorations of both specific topics and general analysis of the 
soul. 
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migration. Among other things, Plato is faulted because he over-
looks the uniqueness of each soul and body and their unique and 
necessary partnership (????????). It is notable, however, that there 
are hints that even for Aristotle ???? may be an imperishable and 
divine substance (408b18-29, cf. 413a6-7). In general, for Aristotle 
the soul cannot be in motion, and hence it cannot be self-motion (I 
4, 408b30-1), nor is it composed of elements (I 5). Plato is wrong 
on both counts, according to Aristotle. But it should not be over-
looked that Aristotle surveyed the earlier opinions with the inten-
tion of adopting the sensible ones and warning against the others 
(403b20-24). So we should not be surprised that many Platonic 
ideas turn up in Aristotle’s own exposition, not least in psychology. 
The soul as form
Aristotle’s own view of cognition (perception and thinking) is dealt 
with in Book II 5-12, and Book III 1-5. The issue of motion (moti-
vation) is handled in III 9-11. However, the general view of soul as 
such is set out in Book II 1-4. In the important first chapter we are 
told that the category of substance includes matter (in itself not a 
particular -‘a this’), form (giving a thing particularity, according 
to which ‘a this’ is said), and the compound, and that matter is po-
tentiality and form actuality. Natural bodies are most clearly sub-
stances, and some have life, so a natural living body is a substance 
and a substance qua composite (412a16). Now the soul is not sub-
stance as a composite living body (which is rather like subject and 
matter), but substance as ‘the form of a natural body which poten-
tially has life’; and as this substance is actuality, the soul is the ac-
tuality, or strictly the first actuality54, of such a body (412a11-22). 
And as such bodies include bodies with organs, the final definition 
of soul is ‘the first actuality of a natural body with organs’ (412b5-
6). Hence, the soul and the body are one, just as imprint and wax 
are (412b6-8). Being form, the soul is also the definition (?????) or 
the essence (?? ?? ?? ?????) of such a body. An axe and an eye are ad-
duced as illustrations: ‘what it is to be an axe’ is the essence of an 
axe, and capacity for sight is the essence of an eye. This choice of 
54 It is an actuality of ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ??????? (412a20-21), 
meaning that it is an acquired state (????), cf. 412b25-26.
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an artifact and an organ reveals that the focus is on form as func-
tion. This reflects Aristotle’s teleological outlook, and is similar 
to Plato’s ????? philosophy in the Republic I 352d-354a. However, 
there is a difference: Plato is concerned with the function of soul, 
whereas Aristotle explores the function of man. This is exactly the 
difference between a mind-body substantialist dualism and Aris-
totle’s hylomorphic view, which looks monistic (soul and body are 
one), but whose interpretation is hotly debated. A solution must be 
found in an understanding of the central metaphysical concepts 
of substance, form/matter and actuality/potentiality. Substance is 
briefly introduced (412a6-9, cf. 402a23-25). It may be either mat-
ter, form or composite. It appears that it is substance in the sense 
of composite (???? ??) that is the focus.
Hylomorphism
In other words, Aristotle’s great idea is to view the soul/body re-
lation in terms of his form/matter relation. This is what has come 
to be called the hylomorphic view. Hence much work has gone into 
understanding the nature of Aristotelian hylomorphism (HM). So 
two questions ought to be posed in this order: What is the sta-
tus of form in HM? How does the application of HM to the mind-
body relation fare? The latter has received much attention since J. 
Ackrill (1972/3) questioned the logic of the form-matter analogy. 
The relation between soul and body is necessary, whereas the form 
and its matter are, it is assumed, only contingently connected.55 
So based on this theory the human body ought to be contingent-
ly enformed, but it is also necessarily enformed, because Aristot-
le holds that when unensouled at death, it is no longer a body.56 
However, the contradiction is, it may be argued, not in HM itself, 
55 It is not always observed that this is not generally true (cf. Met. Z 10-
11). More on this below.
56 Ackrill (1972/3) changed the study of Aristotle’s psychology with an 
article complaining that Aristotle applied his form-matter to the soul-body dis-
tinction inconsistently. He assumes that generally the matter of an object must 
be contingently informed by its form: ‘The contrast of form and matter in a 
composite makes ready sense only where the matter can be picked out in such 
a way that it could be conceived as existing without that form’ (126). So the 
form-matter contrast, as Ackrill sees it, does not fit the soul-body relation. 
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but points rather to limits of an analogy with artifacts such as 
bronze spheres or statues. HM is developed to account for change 
in general. It works well for a lump of bronze made into a statue of 
Sophocles which loses that shape when it is reshaped. In the case 
of man (a living natural body), the body is already formed and so 
is not neutral matter like a lump of metal. Hence, this has been 
seen as a problem with the analogy which scholars have sought to 
remedy. But perhaps it is better to realize that we have to follow 
Aristotle in accepting the limits of the analogy with the creation 
of artifacts, which is of course suggestive as far as it goes. We are, 
at any rate, invited to think of the soul as ‘substance as a form’ 
(412a19-21), and the unity of soul and body answers some ques-
tions about the soul-body relation, such as what is the bearer of 
mental predicates (DA 403a, 408b). However, the real issue is the 
status of form in HM. 
Soul as cause
The classic text on causes (Phys. II 3, 194b24-33) mentions matter, 
form, efficient cause and end, and we are told (Phys. II 7, 198a24) 
that the last three may come to the same thing (cf. APo II 11). In 
DA II 4 the soul is said to be the cause and principle of the living 
body, and just as these [cause and principle] vary, so the soul is the 
cause of the body in three ways: (1) it is the cause of change (local 
change, but also qualitative change in sensation and quantitative 
change in growth and decay), (2) it is the end (the body and its 
parts are ‘for the sake of’ the soul), and (3) it is the substance (for-
mal cause) of ensouled bodies (substance is the cause of being, i.e. 
life) (415b8-28, cf. Met. ? 4, 1044a32-b3). 
As a cause of change, the soul also holds the body together 
(411b6-9), an idea derived from Plato. In the specific case of me-
tabolism and growth, fire is a concurrent cause (as the material-
ists hold), but complex natural wholes like men (for instance) have 
a limit (?????) or ratio (?????) which determines their size and in-
crease; and limit and ratio are marks of soul, not fire, and belong 
to formulable essence (?????) rather than matter (416a9-18). Ar-
istotle seems here on to talk biologically of our DNA, the genetic 
code, the vector of genetic information. This is not to explained in 
simple materialist terms. 
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The soul is also the formal cause: substance as form or in ac-
cordance with the account of the body, which is ‘what it was to 
be’ for a natural body of the right kind, having itself the principle 
of movement and rest (412b10-17, cf. Phys. 193b3-6). The defini-
tion of soul then contains reference to the body, and it is through 
its partnership (????????) with the body in a certain state (407b16) 
that the two interact.
Substance as form is what gives particularity to what it is the 
substance of (412a8-9). If this substance is separated from a hu-
man being, he is no longer a human being. Just as with an axe: 
if you take away its being an axe (its function, cutting power), it 
ceases to be a true axe. The same applies in the case of an eye. 
Hence, the definition of function refers necessarily to the matter. 
Fulfilment refers necessarily to what it is the fulfilment of. The 
soul, being an end (?????), is the actuality, i.e. the fulfilment or 
realization of the body, and the body and its organs serve the soul. 
Hence, both as cause of change, as substance as form and as actu-
ality of the body are the soul and the body necessarily connected. 
The soul as form, again
The close relation between form and matter does not hold in the 
case of a bronze sphere or statue or a wax imprint. Here the form 
does not imply the bronze, metal or wax. But an axe, an eye and 
the ensouled body are different.57 These three items have a func-
57 It may be suggested that the form of an axe (and a house) is less close-
ly tied to its matter than is the form of an eye. The question is raised in Met. Z 
10, 1034b20-28: must the definition of a whole contain a definition of the parts? 
‘The formula of the circle does not include that of the segments, but that of the 
syllable does include that of the letters.’ Further, ‘the bronze is a part of the 
concrete statue, but not of the statue when this is spoken of in the sense of the 
form’ (1035a6-7). In Z 11 we learn that of things found in different materials, 
as a circle may exist in bronze or stone or wood, the essence does not refer to 
the materials, as it is found apart from them.’ The form of man, by contrast, is 
always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind. Still, it is questionable 
whether they are parts of the formula, but it is obviously impossible to form 
an abstraction (1036a31-b7). However, eliminating matter is useless, for ‘some 
things surely are a particular form in a particular matter or particular things 
in a particular state’. For instance, ‘Socrates’ means ‘this particular soul and 
this particular body.’ While the circle can exist without the bronze, man cannot 
exist without his parts. An animal is something perceptible and cannot be de-
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tion, and their matter is ‘for the sake of’ the form, and the form 
is the fulfilment of the individual thing. This means that the con-
nection between form and matter is necessary (perhaps in various 
degrees). The soul-form contains a reference to the body and its 
organs, and the organs cannot be understood without reference to 
the soul. By contrast, the bronze sphere, statue, and wax imprint 
are only contingently connected with their matter, which may be 
different. They are not natural bodies with a function or artefacts 
imitating such bodies. The form-matter scheme is introduced in 
Physics I 7 and II 1 and the biological works in connection with an 
analysis of change, and it also pops up in Metaphysics Z 3 and 7-11 
in connection with the substance philosophy (‘substance is the in-
dwelling form’ 1037a29). Here Aristotle acknowledges that the ap-
plication of form to animals (and men), a case of a particular form 
in a particular matter, has the consequence that the form and its 
definition must refer to motion (and hence to matter), the reason 
being that animals are perceptible (1036b22-30). So when we are 
given a definition of the soul as ‘substance as the form of a natural 
body which potentially has life’ (in DA II 1), we realize that Aris-
totle could argue that this is a special case of hylomorphism. Even 
so, Ackrill (1973) claimed that Aristotle cannot consistently use 
hylomorphism in this way; and Barnes (1995a) protests that it is 
‘so broad a use of ‘form’ and ‘matter’ that their analytical powers 
are entirely lost’ (98). It seems, however, that the almost universal 
opinion that Aristotle is wrong here or needs help unfortunately 
overlooks the fact that Aristotle is perfectly aware that he is put-
ting his schema to a new use in connection with living nature. He 
is not especially trying to explain substantial change (the creation 
of artefacts such a bronze spheres, houses, etc.) but to analyze an-
fined ‘without reference to movement nor without reference to the parts being 
in a certain state’ (1036b22-30). The understanding of this aporetic chapter is 
helped to some extent by Hamlyn (1985), who has a useful observation on the 
strict material implications of form in contrast to essence, e.g., snub versus 
curvature. Jiyuan Yu (1997) has produced an interesting article in which he 
claims that there are two conceptions of hylomorphism in Met. ZH?: ‘isolated 
hylomorphism’, where matter does not enter the definition of form (e.g. Z 7-8), 
and ‘conjoined hylomorphism’, where it does (e.g. H?, esp. H 6). Z 10-11 con-
tains both in a confusing way.
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imals and man and their development (via the ???????/?????????? 
contrast). Interpreters have focused on the body and come up even 
with a BODY underlying the body,58 or with two kinds of matter 
in an animal (the organic body and the elements constituting it).59 
It seems more profitable to concentrate on the form, particularly 
the soul-form.
The status of the soul must then be understood from within the 
framework of the general form-matter contrast. And within the 
general substance philosophy. So while the body is ‘rather’ sub-
stance as subject (???????????) and matter (???), the soul is ‘sub-
stance as the form (?????) of a natural body which potentially has 
life’ (412a17-19). This means that the body is potentiality and the 
soul actuality. In consequence, soul and body are one, like the one-
ness of an imprint in wax, and in general like the oneness of form/
actuality and matter/potentiality (DA 412b6-9). 
Nevertheless, soul and body are both substances. Now sub-
stance is thought to be ‘a this’ (???? ??) and separable (????????), 
and so form and the compound would seem more of a substance 
than matter (Met. 1029a27-30). Similarly, form is a more plausible 
candidate for being nature than matter because the potential flesh 
and bone has not yet gained its own nature, and we refer to a thing 
as what it actually is at the time, rather than what it then is poten-
tially (Phys. II 1, 193a26-b8). The form then is prior to the matter 
and more real (1029a6, cf. PA 640b28-9). Hence, we would expect 
that the soul as form-substance is ‘a this’ (???? ??) and separable. 
But it is not separable,60 and it is rather what makes individual 
substances ‘a this’ (???? ??) and separable. It is what makes us call 
something ‘a this’ (DA 412a8-9, cf. Met. Z 17, Phys. 191a13-4). The 
‘indwelling form from which and the matter the so-called concrete 
substance is derived’ (Met. 1037a28-9). So, paradoxically in view 
of the focus in the Metaphysics on the form as substance, form does 
not strictly live up to the two above-mentioned (common sense) 
58 B. Williams (1986).
59 E.g. J. Whiting (1992).
60 413a3-5, cf. Phys. 193b4-5 ‘except in definition’, conceptually. The body 
as matter is not ‘a this’ (DA 412a7-8), nor is it separable (412b25-26).
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criteria of substance. This is not to say that it is not substance in 
a more technical sense.
Sense-perception
One might say that the soul is moved by the objects of perception, 
if it is moved (406b10-11). However, this is no ordinary motion 
or change. This leads on to the other area of debate: perception. 
There is a whole industry of scholarly work on what is to be made 
of (for instance) Aristotle’s idea that perception is the reception 
of form without matter (424a17-19, 425b23-24). Sense-perception 
occupies a large part of DA II 5-III 2, II 5 and III 2 in particu-
lar. Aristotle follows Presocratic tradition in holding that percep-
tion and thinking are a kind of affection (410a25-26) and are very 
close to each other. The focus must therefore be to identify where 
he departs from tradition. For Aristotle, sense-perception involves 
being moved (?????????) and affection (???????), and seems to be a 
sort of alteration (????????? ???) (416b33-35). More specifically, it 
is an assimilation of the organ, which is potentially such as the 
sense-object is actually (417a17-20, 424a1-2). This is part of Aris-
totle’s general idea of change. 
Now, there are in fact three stages: two kinds of potentiality 
and, partly overlapping, two kinds of actuality. This is then il-
lustrated by knowing: man is by nature capable of knowing, but 
when he has learnt something, he actually knows it but is only 
potentially contemplating. When he then actually exercises this 
knowledge, he has left potentiality entirely behind (417a21-417b2). 
Correspondingly, there are two kinds of affection or alteration: ‘de-
struction by the opposite’ or ‘change to privative dispositions’ on 
the one hand, and on the other hand ‘preservation of what is in po-
tentiality by what is in actuality, and of what is like what acts on it 
in the way that a potentiality is like its actuality’ (417b2-16). Now, 
the second transition to full actuality is ‘a progression toward the 
thing itself’ and is therefore either not an alteration or another 
kind of alteration (417b6-7). 
Applying this distinction to sense-perception, at birth the 
sense-organ has a form: sense-capacity. This may then be acti-
vated, just as knowledge. In the absence of any better term, this 
